We develop and quantitatively implement a dynamic general equilibrium model with labor market matching and endogenous deterllÚnation of the job destruction rate. The mo deI produces a elose match with data on job creation and destruction. Cyelical fluctuations in the job destruction rate serve to magnify the effects of productivity shocks on output; as well as making the effects much more persistent.
INTRODUCTION
It has been well documented that the cyelical adjustment of labor input represents chiefly movement of workers into and out of employment, rather than adjustment of hours at given jobs. Thus, in understanding business cyeles, it is centrally important to understand the formation and breakdown of employment relationships. The nature of employment adjustments over the cyele has also received elose scrutiny. Evidence from a number of sources indicates that recessionary employment reductions are accounted for by elimination of preexisting jobs, i.e. job destruction, to a greater extent than by diminished creation of new * den Haan: University of CaIifomia, San Diego, and NBER. Ramey and Watson: University of Califomia, San Diego. We thank Martin Eichenbaum and VaIerie Ramey for heIpfuI conversations. Rameyand
Watson thank the NSF for financiaI support under grant jobs. Substantial cydical variation in the rate of job destruction suggests that dose r consideration of the breakdown of employment relationships may help to explain how shocks to the economy generate large and persistent output fluctuations. 1 This paper addresses these issues by studying endogenous determination of the job destruction rate in a dynamic general equilibrium model with labor market matching. Produc- tion is assumed to entaillong-term relationships between workers and firms. Each period, a worker and firm who are currently matched must decide whether to preserve or sever their relationship, based on their current-period productivity. By altering the tradeoff between match preservation and severance, aggregate productivity shocks induce fluctuations in the job destruction rate, thereby exerting effects on output that go beyond those resulting from productivity variations in continuing relationships. In our model, fluctuations in job de- struction are accompanied by changes in job matching and savings rates in determining the overall effect of productivity shocks on output.
We calibrate parameters of the model to labor market data, where our measurements of worker and firm matching rates, as well as endogenous and exogenous separation rates, explicitly account for the observation that flows of workers out of employment relationships exceed flows of jobs out of firms. The calibrated model yields excellent matches between descriptive statistics from simulated data and measurements of job flows in manufacturing lFor evidence on the importance of employment adjustment relative to hours adjustment, see Lilien and Hall (1986) . Evidence on recessionary worker fiows is provided by Blanchard and Diamond (1990) , while Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) consider job fiows in manufacturing. Corroborating evidence from Michigan data is provided by Foote (1995) , who finds that for nearly all sectors, most of the recessionary employment adjustment in 1980 and 1982 can be accounted for by increased job destruction as opposed to reduced job creation.
drawn from the Longitudinal Research Database (LRD). In particular, our model generates dynamic correlations of job creation, destruction and employment that closely fit those observed in the data: destruction tends to lead employment, creation lags employment, and creation and destruction exhibit high negative contemporaneous correlation. Moreover, negative recessionary shocks in the mo deI cause job destruction to rise by a greater amount than job creation faUs, so that most of the net employment reduction is accounted for by increased job destruction.
Most quantitative business cycle mo deIs In the RBC tradition share the feature that model-generated output data exhibit dynamic characteristics nearly identicaI to those of the underlying business cycle shocks, so that economic mechanisms play a minimal role in propagating shocks (Cogley and Nason (1993,1995) , Rotemberg and Woodford (1996) ).
We give a resolution to this issue by showing that fiuctuations in the job destruction rate represent a significant propagation mechanism: relatively small and transitory aggregate productivity shocks can generate large and persistent output effects due to their ramifications for the rate of job destruction. In simulated data, the standard deviation of output in our model is two and one-half to three times larger than the standard deviation of the underlying driving process, refiecting magnification of shocks in the period of impact together with slower adjustment of output following shocks, which leads shocks to persisto By way of comparison, the standard RBC model, as well as Hansen's (1985) indivisible labor variant, yield magnification ratios of less than two; further, nearly all of the magnification in the latter mo deIs occurs on impact, meaning that the models generate only slight amounts of persistence. Further, our simulated data generate autocorrelations of output growth rates that match well the autocorrelations observed in V.S. data, refiecting the large amount of persistence generated by our propagation mechanism.
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In our model, interactions between the labor and capital markets, mediated by the rental rate of capital, play the central role in propagating shocks. A negative aggregate productivity shock reduces the incentive to maintain employment relationships, leading to an increase in the job destruction rate. This causes the productivity of capital to fall, since capital must be spread over a smaller number of active employment relationships, and correspondingly the rental rate is driven down, giving lower leveIs of savings and capital relative to models in which the job destruction rate does not vary. Further, the capital stock returns more slowly to the steady state, since rental rates cannot rise as far in response to a reduced capital stock on account of the sensitivity of the job destruction rate to capital costs. In other words, endogeneity of the job destruction rate fiattens the capital demand curve, generating more sluggish adjustment of capital following a shock. In the absence of these capital adjustment effects, persistence is nil in our model, as we show by considering the impulse response function when the capital stock is held fixed. This implies that the need for time-consuming rematching following worker displacement is not sufficient to explain persistent output effects.
Propagation is also affected by the ease with which capital can be adjusted between employment relationships. To consider this issue, we develop a version of the model in which firms must choose their capital leveIs before they observe their idiosyncratic productivity shock within ·the current period. Further, firms have the right to sever their employment relationships and walk away from rental agreements if low idiosyncratic productivity is realized, and capital suppliers must wait until the following period before rerenting the capital to other fums. This kind of costly capital adjustment reduces the effective rental rate received by capital suppliers, since they must factor in the possibility of nonpayment by renting firms.
We show that propagation effects are much greater in the costly capital adjustment version JOB DESTRUCTION AND PROPAGATION OF SHOCKS 5 of the model, because of the extra idle capital associated with increases in the job destruction rate, along with the reduced savings generated by the correspondingly low leveIs of the effective rental rate. Thus, propagation of shocks is heavily infiuenced by costs.of capital adjustment.
Mortensen and Pissarides' (1994) pioneering study has focussed economists' attention on the importance of fiuctuations in the rate of job destruction in accounting for the cydical variation of job fiows.
2 Further, Cole and Rogerson (1996) Several recent papers have considered labor market search and matching within a quantitative dynamic general equilibrium contexto Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996) have implemented labor market matching models in the spirit of Pissarides (1985) , where all job destructión is exogenous and the separation rates are constant over time. These pa20ther papers incorporating endogenous determination or the job destruction rate include Aghion and Howitt (1994), Caballero and Hammour (1994,1996) , Hosios (1994) and Ramey and Watson (forthcoming).
3While they consider a different class of models, Cogley and Nason (1995) and Burnside and Eichenbaum (1996) have also emphasized that imperfections in the adjustment oflabor input can play a role in propagating business cycle shocks.
JOB DESTRUCTION AND PROPAGATION OF SHOCKS 6 pers demonstrate that incorporating matching improves the ability of the RBC framework to explain macroeconomic facts, including low variability of wages and productivity, and persistence of unemployment movements. Using our labor market measurements, however, we show that the implied propagation mechanism is quite weak when the job destruction rate is fuced, and further, models in this vein cannot account for the cyclical patterns of job creation and destruction. More recently, Gomes, Greenwood and Rebelo (1997) have studied the ability of a simple search mo dei incorporating endogenous separation to account for cyclical variability of the unemployment rate, the duration of unemployment spells, and flows into and out of unemployment.
Our paper features some methodological improvements with respect to previous literature. We compute the job destruction rate as a fixed point within a dynamic general equilibrium exhibiting heterogeneity on the production side. Importantly, we do not rely on social planner solutions that restrict model parameters, in contrast to Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996) . Further, we utilize a new specification of the labor market matching function that is motivated by search-theoretic considerations. (1)
where Tt is the rental price of capital, and git gives the expected current value of future joint payoffs obtained from continuing the relationship into the following period. 5 The CCA case will be described below.
Given any contingency that anses, the worker and firm bargain over the division of their surplus. Negotiation is resolved according to the Nash bargaining solution, where 'Ir is the firm's bargaining weight. In particular, after observing productivity information, the worker and firm will choose whether or not to sever their relationship based on which option maximizes their joint surplus. Since the current period payoff becomes less attractive as ait declines, it follows that there exists a leveI Qit such that the partners will opt for separation if ait < Qit, while the match will be preserved and production will occur if ait ~ Qit. We refer to Qit as the job destruction margin. In the PCA case, the job destruction margin is determined as follows: (2) where k: t is the solution to the maximization problem in (1).
In the CCA case, we assume that the firm may avoid making payments for capital if the relationship is severed, either exogenously or endogenously, i.e. the firm may declare bankruptcy in lieu of making payments. Thus, by renting capital the firm se cures an option 50bserve that in (1) the firm chooses capital to maximize the joint returns or the worker and firmo In essence, the worker and firm are able to contract efficiently over the choice or capital.
to utilize kit units of capital, and the firm will exercise the option and pay the rental cost if productivity is sufficiently high. The value !lit and the firm's optimal choice of capital kit simultaneously solve (2) and:
where J.L is the probability distribution over ait. Observe that in (3), the firm avoids making rental payments for realizations in the lower tail of the ait distribution.
Matching Market.
Employment relationships are formed on a matching market.
There is a continuum of workers in the economy, having unit mass, along with a continuum of potential firms having infiníte mass. Let U t denote the mass of unmatched workers seeking employment in period t, and let vt denote the mass of firms that post vacancies. The matching process within a period takes place at the same time as production for that period, and workers and firms whose matches are severed can enter their respective matching pools and be rematched within the same período Ali separated workers are assumed to reenter the unemployment pool, i.e., we abstract from workers' labor force participation decisions.
Firms may choose whether or not to post vacancies, where posting entails a cost of c per period. Free entry by firms determines the size of the vacancy pool.
The fiow o.f successful matches within a period is given by the matching function m(U t , vt),
which is increasing in its arguments and exhibits constant returns to scale. Workers and firms that are matched in period t begin active employment relationships, as described in the preceding subsection, at the start of period t + 1.
Savings Decision.
At the end of each period, foliowing production and matching, output is aUocated between consumption and capital for the following period. For simplicity, JOB DESTRUCTION AND PROPAGATION OF SHOCKS 10 we assume that workers pool their incomes at the end of the period and make the savings decision in manner that maximizes the expected utility function of a representative worker, which is given by: (4) where f3 gives the discount factor and C t indicates aggregate consumption. 6 Symmetry in consumption together with independence over time in the match-specific productivity shocks ait allows us to suppress the i subscripts for the remainder of the paper.
The wealth constraint is determined as follows. Aggregate wage and profit income in period t is given by:
where Nt gives the mass of employrnent relationships at the start of the period, before any shocks have occured. Thus, wage and profit income consists of the payoffs generated in the current period by active employment relationships, net of total vacancy posting costs incurred by unmatched firms. Further, we interpret b as nontradable units of the consumption good that are produced at home by unemployed workers, so that aggregate home-produced output is Bt = bUt. We assume that home-produced output cannot be used to generate capital.
In the PCA case, rental payments are collected on all traded capital. Thus, rental income is given by TtKt, where Kt indicates the aggregate capital stock. Given that capital depreciates at rate 8 per period, it follows that the wealth constraint for the PCR case is: (6) Note that total income in period t consists of wage, profit and capital income, which are equal to total market-produced output net of vacancy posting and depreciation costs, together with home-produced output.
In the CCA case, rental payments are collected only from firms whose relationships are not severed. We assume that capital that has been optioned to firms whose relationships are severed cannot be rented to other fums until the following period. Thus, adjustment of capital across relationships imposes a cost in the form of a one-period delay. The wealth constraint for this case is:
where p~ = Pr{at < {h} gives the endogenous separation rate. Comparing (6) and (7), it may be seen that the CCA case is associated with a lower effective rental rate for given Tt.
Our notion of capital adjustment costs is motivated by the idea that renting capital to a firm involves a certain amount of commitment by the capital supplier, e.g. firms differ in their locations or engineering specifications, so that capital is not immediately transferable across firms. Further, firms are unable to commit contractually to making rental payments under future contingencies. When productivity turns out to be low ex post, the firm can walk away from the rental contract, and the supplier is left to bear the cost of idle capital 12 for one period.
2.4.
Equilibrium. An equilibrium of this model involves three components: (i) payoffmaximizing choices of capital rental k; and job destruction margin Qt for each employment relationship, given the expected future payoffs w~ and 9t and the rental rate rt; (ii) equilibrium determination of the expected future payoffs, given the payoff-maximizing choices and rental rate; and (iii) equilibrium in the capital market.
The conditions for payoff-maximizing k; and Qt under the PCA and CCA cases are given in (1), (2) and (3). Equilibrium values of the expected future payoff terms are determined as follows. Consider first the situation facing a worker and firm that are matched at the start of period t + 1. If their relationship is severed in period t + 1, then they obtain a joint payoff of b + W~+l' If they avoid severance, then their relationship generates a surplus net of their outside joint payoff, which may be written as follows:
The worker and firm bargain over this surplus, obtaining shares 1 -7r and 7r, respectively.
Division of the surplus is accomplished via transfer payments, e.g. the firm makes a wage payment to the worker.
Next, consider the situation of a worker in the period t unemployment pool. (9) where )..": = m(U t , Vi)/U t gives the probability that the worker is successfully matched.
Observe in (9) that the worker obtains (1 -7r)St+l with probability )..":
refiecting the event that the worker is matched in period t and the match survives in period t + 1.
A firm in the period t vacancy pool, in contrast, must obtain a payoff of zero as a consequence of free entry. In particular, we have:
where )..{ = m(U t , Vi)/Vi gives the firm's matching probability. Finally, the expected future joint returns of a worker and firm who remain matched in period t are:
In contrast to (9) and (10), the partners in a continuing relationship do not need to be matched, so that they obtain the surplus St+l with probability (1 -pX)(l -pr).
It remains. to consider the capital market. In the PCA case, the equilibrium Tt is determined by the following market clearing condition:
The left-hand side of (12) indicates the demand for capital, consisting of the total number of employment reIationships at the start of period t times the expected capital rental for JOB DESTRUCTION AND PROPAGATION OF SHOCKS 14 each relationship. The capital market clears when capital demand is equal to the supply of capital in period t, given by Kt. In turn, Kt+! is determined by maximization of (4) subject to (6), for which the following is sufficient under the usual concavity condition:
As for the CCA case, (12) and (13) are replaced by:
Observe in (14) that each matched firm selects the same leveI of capital, refiecting the assumption that capital is chosen before idiosyncratic productivity shocks are observed.
Correspondingly, the effective rental rate in (15) is lower than Tt+!, since a proportion of firms will decline to make rental payments. we derive these probabilities from relationships between stocks and flows arising in a deterministic steady state of the mode!. These may be regarded as average relationships over the long run. In measuring labor market flows, we begin with the observation that flows of workers out of employment relationships exceed flows of jobs out of firms; in other words, worker flows exceed job flows. As a consequence, a substantial proportion of the firms that experience separations will desire to replace the lost workers, and will be successful at doing 50, within the current period. We will need to account for firms' attempts to refill such job openings in our measurement of job flows.
Summary.
Let NS denote the steady state stock of employment relationships, and let US and VS represent the per period flows of workers and firms, respectively, through the matching pools in the steady state. it is reasonable to assume that firms do not attempt to rehire following such separations.
It follows that the rate at which separations are reposted by firms, denoted by w f , will be equal to the proportion of all separations that are exogenous, or w f = pX /0.10.
We define job destruction and job creation in the following way. Period-to-period job destruction is recorded as total separations pNs less those job opening& that are reposted and successfully refilled by firms within the period. The steady state mass of jobs destroyed per period is thus given by p(l -w f )./)NS, where )/ indicates the steady state matching probability for a firmo Job creation is recorded as the mass of firms who have no employees at the beginning of the period, but who find workers in the matching phase of the period.
Therefore, >/ (VS -pwf NS) is the mass of jobs created each period in the steady state. Note that a job is neither created nor destroyed by a firm that both loses and gains a worker in the same period.
We next impose the condition that the fiow of jobs out of the stock of employment relationships must equal the fiow of jobs into relationships, or job destruction must equal job creation, as required for a steady state. This condition may be written as follows: (16) Observe that this condition is equivalent to the steady state property that total separations equal total new matches, or pNs = >/v s .
Although the data is restricted to the manufacturing sector, the LRD evidence reported 
Combining (1.6), (17) and (18) 9Qur approach to measuring ).,W is in line with Cole and Rogerson's (1996) idea that including part of the not-in-Iabor-force population in the unemployment pool makes for a comparatively low estimate of the worker matching probability.
Specification.
We now turn to parameterization of the model. The following standard specifications of production and utility functions are adopted:
The aggregate productivity shock is determined by the process In Zt = ç In Zt-l In choosing the matching function, we depart from the standard Cobb-Douglas specification that has been used in the previous literature. Our new specification is motivated by considering how the matching technology operates on individual workers and firms. Imagine that J t channels are set up to carry out matching within a given period. Each worker is assigned randomly to one of the channels, as is each firmo Agents assigned to the same channel are successfully matched, while the remaining agents are unmatched. With this procedure, a worker locates a firm with probability Yt/ J t , a firm locates a worker with probability Ut! J t , and the total mass of matches is U t Yt/ J t .
The number of channels J t depends on the sizes of the unemployment and vacancy pools, refiecting thick market externalities. In particular, we adopt the specification Jt = (U: + ~I)l/I, from which we obtain the following matching function:
Observe that the matching function is increasing in its arguments and satisfies constant returns to scale. (9), (10), (11) and (13) are parameterized using Chebyshev polynomials of the state variables Zt, Kt and N t . These polynomials are computed exactly on Chebyshev grid points. Further, within each iteration of the computation procedure, an equilibrium point for the capital market is determined, involving a fixed point of equations (2) and (13) This raises the possibility that vt will be slightly greater than zero with unit probability, which can lead ta discontinuities.in the value of vt as a function of the state variables.
llHansen and Wright (1992), for example, make these selections in their analysis of labor market implications af REC models. Although we cannot directly invoke factor share comparisons in our setting, the choice of Q = 0.36 does yield a quarterly output/capital ratio of roughly 10 percent in our simulated data, in line with U .S. evidence.
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CCA cases, as shown in Table 1 , while the other parameters remain fixed across the two cases.
The first three rows of Table 2 report separation and matching probabilities estimated from V.S. data, as discussed in Section 3.1, along with values computed from steady states of the model having deterministic aggregate productivity. The fourth row considers the ratio of the standard deviation of employment to the standard deviation of output, which in the simulated data is sensitive to the leveI of (la. We measure employment and output by converting monthly nonagricultural employment and industrial production for V.S. manufacturing, expressed on a per capita basis, into quarterly series starting at the middle month of each quarter for 1972:2-88:4, in line with the LRD employment measures. For the PCA and CCA models, this ratio is estimated using simulated data. 12 Actual and simulated data for this case are logged and HP filtered. As seen in Table 2 , the simulated data produce good matches along the four dimensions considered.
RESULTS

Empirical Evaluation. Evaluation of the model's performance relative to V.S.
aggregate data is given in Panel A of Table 3 . Although both versions of the model perform well, the CCA model does a slight1y better job explaining the observed volatility of output, as well as matching the empirical volatilities of consumption, investment and employment relative to output, when compared to the PCA model. Tables 3 through 5 below. 13It should be noted that measured consumption in the simulated data includes only consumption of market-produced output, in line with the empirical consumption data. While we do not offer a complete JOB DESTRUCTION AND PROPAGATION OF SHOCKS
22
We next consider the ability of the model to account for characteristics of the LRD data.
Consistent with our measurement procedure, as expressed in equation (16), we define rates of job creation and destruction in the simulated data as follows:
where Pt denotes the realized separation rate in period t. Thus, job creation is comprised of total matches in period t net of those matches serving to fill separations that are reposted within the period, while job destruction is given by total separations net of those that are refilled within the period.
Panel B of Table 3 compares volatilities of job creation and destruction relative to manufacturing employment in the in the LRD and simulated data. The chief discrepency between model and observation is that job creation is too volatile in the simulated data: creation is roughly seven times more volatile than employment in the PCA and CCA cases, versus less than five times in the LRD data.
14 theory of wage formation, it is possible to obtain a measure of bargaining transfers from the firm to the worker under the hypothesis that the firm appropriates the payoffs from an active employment relationship, which may be regarded as a measure of wages. In the CCA model, the standard deviation of this wage measure relative to the standard deviation of output is 0.28, and the contemporaneous correlation of wages and output is 0.75. Wage volatility and output correlation are smaller in our model relative to standard RBC models due to the fact that low productivity relationships experience separations in lieu of wage reductions.
14While our model does not produce the oft-discussed prediction that the volatility of destruction ought to exceed the volatility of creation, it should be noted that this prediction is distinct from the result that employment adjustment following recessionary shocks consists mostly of increases in job destruction rather than reductions in job creation. We show below that our model does generate the latter prediction.
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High volatility of creation can be accounted for by the fact that creation rates become very small in periods when Vi is low relative to pX N t , as seen in (20 At the same time, the greater amount of endogenous separation raises the volatility of destruction.
Dynamic correlations between creation, destruction and manufacturing employment are presented in Table 4 . In the LRD data, destruction tends to lead employment, in the sense that employment exhibits a large negative correlation with destruction lagged two quarters.
Further, creation tends to lag employment. As may be observed in the table, the model displays remarkable agreement with the data, with signs and magnitudes of covariances being quite dose. In particular, in both versions of the model, employment has a large nega tive correlation with past destruction and future creation. Observe further that the large negative contemporaneous correlation between creation and destruction is well matched by both the PCA and CCA models.
The cyclical variation in job creation and destruction implied by the model is illustrated
in Figure 1 , which shows impulse responses for a three standard deviation negative aggregate productivity shock in the CCA mode!. On impact, a large destruction spike is induced by an increase in the job destruction margin, accompanied by a smaller dip in creation, as firms post fewer vacancies in anticipation of lower future aggregate productivity. Thus, the model replicates the finding that recessionary employment reductions are accounted for by increases in job destruction to a greater extent than by reductions in job creation.
The induced increase in unemployment following the shock is sufficiently large to drive creation above its preshock leveIs in the period following the shock, as the highermatching probability for fums ofIsets the reduction in vacancies. This "echo efIect" of destruction on creation, along with the simultaneous negative movements in creation and employment at the point of the shock, account for the slight negative contemporaneous correlation between creation and employment. Further, the echo efIect operates with a one period lag in the model, as opposed to a two period lag in the data, as the creation/ destruction correlations indicate.
Propagation. A key issue in modelling business cycles is the manner in which
economic factors captured by the model serve to amplify and spread over time the underlying driving processes. As pointed out by Cogley and Nason (1993,1995) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1996) , the intertemporal substitution mechanism at the heart of the REC model does a poor job propagating shocks, in that the characteristics of output series generated by the model closely mimic those of the underlying driving processo This property of the REC mo deI is strikingly at odds with the empirical observation of important difIerences between measured productivity and output. Our model introduces cyclical variation of the job destruction rate as a new mechanism for propagating shocks through the economy.
Variations in the destruction rate lead shocks to be magnified, since small variations in productivity can lead to big changes in measured output, as workers substitute between market-and home-produced output. Moreover, the efIects of an increase in job destruction have highly persistent effects. In the following subsection, we show that interactions between the labor and capital markets play the central role in generating large amounts of persistence JOB DESTRUCTION AND PROPAGATION OF SHOCKS 25 in our model.
To clarify the discussion, we break down propagation effects into two categories. First, a productivity shock may be magnified in its effect on output within the period that the shock occurs, which we refer to as impulse magnification. Second, following the initial period, the output effect of the shock may die away more slowly than the effect on productivity, so that the shock has a more persistent effect on output. The combined effects of impulse magnification and persistence give rise to total magnification of the shock, reflecting the greater effect on output in all periods. We measure total magnification by the ratio of the standard deviation of output to the standard deviation of productivity. Total magnification in the PCA and CCA models is much larger than is impulse magnification, indicating that these models generate signficant persistence. For unfiltered simulated data, total magnification is just under twice as large as impulse magnification in these modeIs. For the CCA model, in particular, productivity shocks are magnified over three times in their effect on output. The greater amounts of impulse and total magnification in the JOB DESTRUCTION AND PROPAGATION OF SHOCKS
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CCA model relative to the PCA mo dei indicate the importance of capital adjustment costs for the propagation of shocks. In contrast, impulse and total magnification are virtually the same in the RBC and Hansen models, indicating that persistence is nil. Table 5 also reports total magnification for HP fiItered simuIated data. HP fiItering has almost no effect with respect to the RBC and Hansen mo deIs , reflecting Iack of persistent effects. However, some of the total magnification is removed by filtering the PCA and CCA models, although magnification remains significant. Removing Iow frequency variation gives a misleading picture of total magnification under the PCA and CCA models, smce magnification continues to be important even at low frequencies.
These results are expressed graphically in Figure 2 , which presents impulse responses for aggregate productivity together with output in the four models. In the RBC and Hansen mo deis , the shock is magnified in the initial period, but thereafter output dynamics track the productivity dynamics very closely. Persistent output effects are vividly apparent for the PCA and CCA mo deis , however, as the adjustment of output toward the steady state is much slower than the productivity adjustment.
The added persistence introduced by our model is heIpful for explaining the autocorrelation structure observed in D.S. data. Figure 3 27 shock. 15 Further, the PCA and CCA mo deis yield posi tive second-order autocorrelations, which are qualitatively consistent with the data. 16 To assess the importance of cyclical variation in the job destruction rate for our findings,
we consider an alternative version of the CCA model, in which alI separations are exogenous.
This is accomplished by setting b = O and pX = 0.10; since home production is zero, workers and firms will never voluntarily sever their relationships, meaning that ali separations are exogenous. As seen in Figure 3 , autocorrelations for this exogenous separation case represent a slight improvement over the RBC model, but are still far from those observed in the data.
Impulse responses for the exogenous separation and CCA mo deis are compared in Figure   4 . While the output effect of the shock in the exogenous separation case is slightly more persistent than the effect on productivity, impulse magnification is virtually nonexistent.
As a consequence, output reductions remain small relative to the CCA model, and total magni/ication is only@rom this we conclude that fluctualions in lhe job deslruclion rate are central to produ ing the impulse magnification and persistence underlying our total magnification results. CCA mo deIs are shown in Figure 4 . As observed in the figure, output dynamics for the fixed capital version display a large amount of impulse magnification, since the endogenous separation rate rises in response to the negative shock. However, adjustment of output back to the steady state is much more rapid than in the CCA model, indicating that the shock does not have a persistent effect in the absence of capital adjustment. Important1y, the need for gradual rematching of displaced workers does not in itself generate significant persistence.
As Figure 4 makes clear, variability in both the employment separation rate and capital stock are needed in order to account for the persistence generated by the CCA model. At the heart of the propagation mechanism is the interaction between the labor and capital markets, mediated by the capital rental rate. Endogenous determination of the job destruction margin implies that p~ will rise in response to a persistent decline in Zt, since the payoffs from maintaining employment relationships will become less attractive. Further, the existing capital stock will be spread over a smaller number of active employment relationships, reducing the marginal productivity of capital at the market clearing rental rate. These effects lead the effective rental rate in the CCA case, given by (1-pX)(l_ p~)rt, to be driven down more sharply than in the absence of fiuctuations in the separation rate. As seen in Figure   5 , a negative productivity shock leads the effective rental rate for the CCA model to drop In the PCA model, the actual and effective rental rates are the same, so that pr does not exert an independent effect on the effective rental rate, as in the CCA model. Thus, fiuctuations in pr affect rental rates only through altering the marginal productivity of capital, and the propagation mechanism is correspondingly weaker. In essence, capital adjustment costs generate added persistence through their effect on the effective rental rate.
Figures 5 and 6 further indicate that the effective rental rate and capital stock in the CCA model remain low for a significantly longer period following the shock than in the RBC and exogenous separation models. This slow adjustment is explained by the dampening effect that variation of the separation rate exerts on capital adjustment. Reductions in the capital stock exert upward pressure on rental rates, due to rising marginal productivity of capital, but this upward pressure is dampened by increases in p~ that are induced by the higher rental rates, as greater capital costs reduce the payoffs to maintaining employment relationships. In other words, variation in the separation rate serves to fiatten the capital demand curve in the CCA model, relative to a comparison model without employment separation effects. This may be seen in Figure 7 , which depicts capital demand curves for the CCA and corresponding standard grQwth models, and where the fiatter curve under CCA is evident. Thus, capital adjustment in the CCA model is slowed by the fact that reductions in the capital stock can induce only limited increases in the return to investment.
In sum, the rental rate implications of variability in the job destruction rate lead to sharper and more persistent reduction in the capital stock following a negative shock. In our model, aggregate productivity shocks are strongly magnified in their effects on output, both in the period of impact and in the periods following. The degree to which shocks produce persistent effects is especial1y great in our model, relative to other models, due to the fact that fiuctuations in the job destruction rate lead to large and persistent adjustments in the effective rate of return on capital and the capital stock. Moreover, magnification of shocks is increased to the extent that there are costs of adjusting capital across employment relationships. Our results suggest that interactions between the labor and capital rriarkets may be of central importance in propagating shocks.
In assuming that idiosyncratic shocks are i.i.d. over time, we have departed from much of the literature, which has followed Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) in focussing on persistent idiosyncratic shocks. We have made the independence assumption for simplicity only, however, and introducing persistence should not materially alter our propagation results. In fact, persistence may lead to greater total magnification, to the extent that a given leveI of empIoyment variability can be sustained with lower variability of idiosyncratic shocks, thereby pIacing the job destruction margin doser to mean idiosyncratic productivity.18
In the mo deI considered here, workers trade off payoffs from empIoyment relationships against payoffs obtained from unemployment benefits. Separations that occur are privateIy efficient. As an alternative, separations may be driven by contracting problems, where agents cannot constrain themseIves from double-crossing their partners, but benefits from doublecrossing are not actually realized when separations occur. Privately inefficient separations associated with such fragile contracts are considered in Ramey and Watson (forthcoming).
A useful extension of the current model would incorporate noncontractible choices by the worker and firm into the production processo Costs of job 10ss would depend on the extent to which separation is driven by contractual fragility as opposed to positive returns to unemployment.
A further useful extension would more dosely examine the interactions between labor and capital adjustment. Recent work by Ramey and Shapiro (1997) has focussed on costs of reallocating capital across sectors. Incorporating these ideas into the current framework would make possible a rich synthetic analysis of factor adjustment.
18Persistent idiosyncratic shocks give rise to a reallocative motive for job destruction, whereby negative shocks induce workers to break up employment relationships in order to search for higher-productivity matches; see C~ballero and Hammour (1994) and Gomes, Greenwood and Rebelo (1997) . This approach encounters difficulties in accounting for the observed experiences of displaced workers, who earn substantially lower wages in new jobs for a number of years following the displacement (Ruhm (1991) ). In reconciling our own model with this evidence, we conjecture that job heterogeneity will play a pivotal role.
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